While this post is more than able to serve its own purpose, it would be contextualized better if you read the previous one

The important question here will be how all of this random is reflected in Real Madrid's performance on the field, what are the "general principles" of Real Madrid's current playing style, how quickly the team collapses when it does not bear fruit, and when it is difficult for it to return?

The most prominent example will be from the last El Clásico match. Previously, Ancelotti outperformed Barcelona's pressure in the building stages of the game by expanding the distances between his players in a spaced structure, allowing Los Blancos players to use their individual technical skills to break the pressure through dribbling and carrying the ball, and how Modric's dropping to the first third and his escape from oversight by moving the game to the opposite side, as Vinicius and Mendy set off in a position of numerical and qualitative advantage that caused the first goal.

This attempt failed twice in the last El Clasico, so Modric and Kroos went down to the first third, losing its effectiveness through Xavi’s precautionary measures on the opposite side of the field, and here it was time for the shot that caused Barcelona’s first goal, and at first glance, it seemed like a fatal mistake from Camavinga in acting. with the ball.

Around the 33rd minute, Real Madrid's build-up began with a hand pass from Courtois towards Rudiger to start the attack, and it seems clear that Barcelona's pressure has determined his passing options; Pedri and De Jong are committed to monitoring the duo Modric and Kroos, Gavi blocks the way for the long diagonal pass towards Carvajal, and Lewandowski blocks the German defender’s way back towards Militao and Dembele accompanies Mendy, and the most important of all is Busquets monitoring Camavinga.

Once the ball is received, Rudiger finds only two options; Either pass to Camavinga under pressure as the only player capable of receiving the ball, or throwing a long longitudinal farther towards Benzema for fear of Barcelona extracting the ball in the first third, and most importantly, he must decide quickly because Dembele started running towards him to force him to pass after he put Mendy in his "Cover Shadow". The French midfielder starts to move to ask for the ball, which is what happens.

Now let's examine the three options for the poor Frenchman in this situation. The first option is to receive the ball by turning in one movement, "Receiving on the turn", a solution that is not allowed by space constraints due to Pedri's proximity to Camavinga. The second option is to return the ball to where it came from, with the risk that Dembele may intercept its path.

Finally, there is the option to pass to the free man (Ferlan Mendy) with one touch, which is the only solution to advance the ball from this position, but his problem is that it requires the use of the strong (left) foot of Camavinga.

Camavinga - with an expected and logical lack of experience - went to the last solution, which is the same solution that Busquets expected from the start, so you can easily conclude that he deliberately sidestepped the Frenchman while pressing to close the pass towards Mendy, hence Barcelona's first goal that evening after a chain of action-reaction began

Busquets anticipates Camavinga's behaviour and intercepts the ball. Dembele passes the ball directly to Pedri, who visually scans his position more than once before receiving the ball. As a result of Pedri knowing his surroundings, he is able to pass with one touch directly to Lewandowski. Lewandowski finds Gavi who broke into the penalty area easily since Carlo had expanded the distance as mentioned earlier in the post.

The Adaptation Lie

In the end, Camavinga took responsibility for the mistake, but the problem here is not an individual mistake, but rather an ill-considered tactical position that limits the players' options and exposes their intentions to the opponent. Busquets' body language and posture from the start suggest that he didn't have a doubt for a moment that Camavinga was going to try to pass the ball to Mendy, and that's where the goal was made.

The problem is that Barcelona had only had rare opportunities from open play before this moment, and the answer was in the style and drawing of the worn-out play structure on the part of Ancelotti. The problem is that the crisis was not only individual here, as Ancelotti stated about the Villarreal and Atletico Madrid matches, but rather it was in the ideas themselves, and the team paid for it in general but specifically young players who should not be put in such situations.

I do not know how all this can be considered adaptation or the ability to "do many things" as Ancelotti describes it. In fact, since the beginning of its current season, Real Madrid has shown only one face in almost any major match; Retreating in a medium or low mass and relying on the wingers’ runs behind the opponent’s lines after Modric or Kroos took care of solving the preparation dilemma in the first third, and in many of these matches the opponents were able to create many opportunities at that stage, but Ancelotti’s players were more decisive than any measurable way.

That's what usually happens in games like this, except it didn't happen against Barcelona. The second goal, for example, came from an unnecessarily fabricated shift by Carvajal. While the right decision was to continue to monitor Gavi, the Spanish full-back volunteered to transform a position of weakness for Barcelona into a position of sweeping advantage, when he got out of his position for no real reason and left Gavi in a huge space that he used later in assisting Lewandowski's goal that killed the match, a scene associated with Real Madrid defenders in the last decade; The foolish, ill-conceived courage that often cost them dearly.

These shots often cost Real Madrid dearly in El Clasico matches only. Perhaps because of the balance of mental and psychological superiority that Barcelona has accumulated in the last decade over its eternal rival, which makes it difficult to return to Los Blancos in such matches, but the shots themselves do not cost much in the Champions League matches or throughout the season, but rather in the memory of the Meringue players, defeats to Barcelona were associated with huge titles at the end of the season, like what happened last season, and the same thing was repeated in 2014, 2016, 2017 and 2018.

So, in a funny way, these huge, humiliating defeats to Barcelona actually contribute to Real Madrid becoming more confident in winning important titles instead of exposing the flaws of such an approach.

A quick look at Real Madrid's tally over the past decade confirms that it is the team that glows with randomness, improvisation, and individual moments of magic in major matches. All teams and clubs in the world go through such periods, and they all suffer, but none of them achieved what Real Madrid managed to achieve during them, to the extent that randomness replaced the system, and it became the origin and everything else was the exception.

Sources

Ancelotti: “Rodrygo would be perfect for playing the No.10 in a 4-2-3-1”
Ancelotti: "It’s hard to understand how a team that plays so well in the second half can play so bad in the first half"
What did Carlo Ancelotti say to inspire Real Madrid’s Copa del Rey comeback against Villarreal?
'It’s the start of a new era’: Ancelotti plots bright future for Real Madrid
Real Madrid 3-1 Atletico Madrid: Rodrygo the supersub and Simeone in trouble